Crises of identity and integration are faced by many new states. Such crises originate from groups having distinct ethnic, racial, religious and other identities that mark them apart from the rest of the population or communities within the population of a state. They are apprehensive about being merged and assimilated into the dominant culture and feel denied of access to resource distribution roles. They are often actually dispossessed and deprived by the dominant group who enjoy, and can engineer, the support of political authority.
The tribal people residing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts comprise ethnic groups that came from different racial stock, had distinct cultures, ways of life, and social organizations. They constituted less than 1 percent of the population but occupied one-tenth of the territory. There are other tribal groups scattered in the bordering areas of some northern regions, but they have not felt the need to challenge the authority of the central government.
The distinctive status of the CHT rests on its geography, and on demographic concentration. The root of the problem between the tribals and settlers is the issue of land ownership. The hill people claim the land to be theirs by virtue of being indigenous to the region. The dissenting view maintains that they are as much settlers as the Bengalis are, the only difference being that they had settled centuries earlier from adjacent Myanmar. The Bengalis had maintained that as citizens of the state they have the right to movement and residence anywhere within the territory of the Republic of Bangladesh. Pressure on land in alluvial plains forced many to settle down in the hilly regions. Increasing migration of Bengalis to the hills region tended to give them economic power and threatened to imbalance the population ratio.
The problem was not new. It had old historical roots, but new dimensions were added during the Pakistan and Bangladesh periods. Therefore, the prime requirement for achieving enduring and lasting peace is to place the issue in its proper perspective. It requires statesmanship, which would rise above petty political considerations. It requires vision and farsightedness by those in leadership within the parties to the conflict. Those leaders should be able to foresee the consequences of protracted struggle and the benefits of harmony and co-existence. The situation needs the political will to implement solutions once they have been found, and requires placing total allegiance to the sovereignty and integrity of the state. There should be a proper appreciation of the fact that an agreement made outside the floor of the Parliament, though made on behalf of the government, has no authority to alter the basic character of the state. The devolution of authority and rights granted to tribals cannot alter the unitary character of the state. Straightforward bargains should replace manipulative politics. These are the essence, the preconditions for achieving lasting peace. It would be wiser for the government to deal with the moderates now over the lack of proper implementation of the accord than to have to cope with extremists later.
The costs of failure are high. Disruptive activities, armed warfare, likely violations of human rights, losses of lives and resources, exposing the border regions to external threats—all of these are costs that the nation can ill afford to pay if lasting peace is not achieved in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.