Part Three

Political Responses of the Governments of Bangladesh (1972-2001)

Upon its independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited a problem in the CHT that had long historical roots, but which was exacerbated during the Pakistan period. The successive governments of Bangladesh perceived the problem in their own ways and sought solutions accordingly. However, the policies adopted by the different regimes failed to contain, curb, or bring about a cessation of hostilities.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975)

The response of the Mujib government demonstrated both political and military approaches. While addressing a huge gathering at Rangamati during the 1973 election campaign, Sheikh Mujib categorically stated his government's intention to pay attention to the special needs of the tribals. At the same time, he declared that from that day forward they would be considered Bengalis [12] —a counter-productive statement, since the tribals interpreted it as an invitation to surrender their distinctive identity. Eventually, in order to contain the militant insurgency movement, the government of Bangladesh deployed security forces to aid civil power, in accordance with existing laws of the country. Following the army coup of mid-1975, tribal insurgency became more aggressive, with India serving as a safe haven for the insurgents. [13]

Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981)

The Zia regime perceived the CHT issue primarily as an economic one and held that economic development of the region would eventually undermine the appeal and strength of the movement. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) was created in January 1976, which in addition to other activities embarked on community development programs. A Multisectoral Development Program was undertaken with a view to create the necessary conditions for the longer-term socioeconomic development of the region. But with increasing militancy and armed action by the Shanti Bahini, the government was compelled to deploy armed forces in October 1976 in aid of civil law and order agencies.

As a political measure to appease the insurgents, General Zia, the president, appointed Rajmata (the mother of the Chakma king) Benita Roy as advisor to the president, later to be replaced by A.S. Prue Choudhury. However, the political move did not produce the intended results, as both advisors belonged to the royal family and the insurgents did not have much confidence in their efficacy.

The government of Bangladesh, as a next step, looked for ways and means to build a broad-based consensus. On 2 July 1977, the Tribal Convention, a forum representing tribal people, was formed. The Tribal Convention held talks, preparatory to official level negotiation, for an enduring political solution that would be built on consensus. Despite initial interest in the process, the PCJSS subsequently backed out due to the party's internal problems. However, before the government's renewed efforts for creating conditions for dialogue to find a political solution could materialize, the process was halted due to the assassination of Ziaur Rahman in May 1981.

During 1979-81 about one hundred thousand landless Bengalis were settled in the CHT, raising the ratio of settlers to tribals to 27.05 percent. [14] This caused great resentment among the tribals, especially as each settler family was allocated five acres of hilly land or four acres of mixed land composed primarily of rice land.

Justice Abdus Sattar (May 1981-March 1982)

Justice Sattar, during his short tenure, received a delegation on 5 February 1982, led by the President's Advisor on CHT affairs, Subimal Dewan, and comprised of tribals and Bengalis. The discussions did not result in any concrete decision.

Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982-1990)

The Ershad government followed a three-fold approach: it continued counterinsurgency operations; it took steps to develop socioeconomic structures; and it pursued initiatives to ensure a comprehensive political settlement. The government declared the CHT a Special Economic Area (SEA) in August 1985, with the objective of integrating tribals and non-tribals into the mainstream of economic activities. The expectation was that this would lead to an overall development of the region.

In 1982 a liaison committee, formed for communication purposes and headed by Upendra Lal Chakma, failed largely because PCJSS questioned the legitimacy of the committee. A rift in the PCJSS leadership, which was also partly responsible for the rejection of the committee, led to the killing of M.N. Larma on 10 November 1983. The Priti faction surrendered to the government on 29 April 1985, signaling an indirect victory of the policy pursued by the regime.

The Tribal Convention was revived on 30 August 1983, with the objective of creating public support for a negotiated settlement. The government announced some important measures in October 1983, including the suspension of Bengali settlement, the granting of amnesty to insurgents, and a proposal for direct dialogue with the PCJSS leadership. [15] The first ever dialogue was held on 21 October 1985, as congenial conditions were created by these announcements and by the activities of the liaison committee. The dialogue proved inconsequential, but both sides undertook to continue the process.

On 9 September 1987, the government set up a National Committee for the CHT with the then Minister for Planning as the head, with the mandate to take necessary steps for resuming dialogue with PCJSS and recommend action for solving the problems.

The second dialogue, held on 17-18 December 1987, was indeed a "repeat performance." The PCJSS put forward a five-points demand with twenty-five other detailed demands added. The government rejected these demands, as they were incompatible with the constitution of Bangladesh. Though the meeting ended in a deadlock, both sides agreed to meet again.

The third dialogue, held on 24-25 January 1988, also failed. The PCJSS refused to modify their demands as suggested by the government, who requested that they conform to the spirit and provisions of the constitution.

Both the fourth and fifth attempts at constructive dialogue during 1988 failed because both sides adhered to their earlier positions. The political strategy of involving representatives of the three hill districts in a number of meetings in the latter part of 1988 resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding. This led to a shift in the position of the PCJSS, who now called for holding the sixth dialogue.   

Accordingly, on 14-15 December 1988, the sixth dialogue was held. At this dialogue PCJSS demanded "regional autonomy" in place of their earlier stance in favor of provincial autonomy. Their other demands remained unchanged. The government, while agreeing to the PCJSS position, put forward a proposal containing nine points. The PCJSS refrained from giving their decision but agreed to do so at the seventh meeting. The seventh dialogue could not be held, as the PCJSS did not make the necessary gesture by the stipulated deadline (January 1989).

The government then took some legal and executive measures. During February 1989, the Parliament enacted the Rangamati Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Khagrachari Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Bandarban Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, and the Hill District (Repeal and Enforcement of Law and Special Provision) Act of 1989. The Special Affairs Ministry was constituted by the government in July 1990 to look after the affairs of the CHT. All of these moves led towards a positive outcome. First, a beginning was made in the direction of autonomy. Second, the smaller tribes for the first time came to be involved in the political process which had for so long been dominated by the Chakmas, the Marmas, and the Tripuras. Primary education, agriculture, and health and family planning were transferred to newly constituted district councils, which were comprised of elected tribal representatives.

Another important political initiative taken by the government to solve the CHT crisis during these years was the declaration of four general amnesties. Some 2,294 insurgents surrendered and 30,390 tribals returned from camps across the border. [16]

Khaleda Zia (1991-1996)

The government led by Khaleda Zia declared a general amnesty for the insurgents with an offer of cash rewards for surrendering their arms. In a major policy statement made at Khagrachari on 12 May 1992, Khaleda Zia expressed the hope that it was possible to find a political solution through constitutional process and within the constitutional framework.

During July 1992, the government appointed a nine-member committee (with everyone on the committee being members of Parliament) to look into the CHT issue, with a directive to submit recommendations within two months.

The government attached utmost importance to the very sensitive issue of land ownership. But decisions on the issue had to be preceded by a cadastral survey, which was extremely expensive and time consuming.

The local administration was entrusted with responsibilities for relief and rehabilitation. Since the fiscal year 1989-90, fifty thousand families affected by insurgency had been covered under various relief and rehabilitation programs such as pacification, rehabilitation of non-tribal families, rehabilitation of tribal families, and rehabilitation of returnees from India. For the fiscal year 1992-1993, Tk. 399 million (approximately US $1.05 million) were allocated under these four programs. [17] The three Local Government Councils also received annual grants for development purposes, which had some positive impact on the local people and encouraged many tribals to return. The perceptible increase in the number of returnees was a reflection of the confidence of tribals in the democratically elected government. The insurgency situation appeared to improve, with the PCJSS declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 10 August 1992.

The Parliamentary Committee headed by Ret. Col. Oli Ahmed for conducting negotiations with the PCJSS held seven dialogues, and a sub-committee headed by Rashed Khan Menon, Member of the Parliament, held six dialogues. But the process stopped by mid-1994, while refugee repatriation stopped by the beginning of 1995, perhaps owing to the increasing preoccupation of the ruling party with instability in the political arena.

Sheikh Hasina (May 1996-2001)

The Awami League in election campaigns in both 1991 and 1996 stood committed to addressing the demand for a political solution to the CHT crisis. During her election campaign in the CHT in 1996, Sheikh Hasina promised to form a "parliamentary committee" to resolve the crisis politically. It also seemed that the people of the CHT had great expectations from the Awami League government. Members of parliament from constituencies in the CHT belonged to the Awami League, which facilitated the peace deal between the two sides. On September 30, the prime minister announced the formation of an eleven-member national committee under the chairmanship of Abul Hasnat Abdullah, Chief Whip. The single objective for the committee was to suggest a way to find a "permanent political solution within the framework of the state sovereignty of Bangladesh." During December 21-24, the first meeting took place between this committee and the PCJSS, represented by Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, also known as Shantu Larma. Unlike this first meeting, PCJSS members came to Dhaka for the remaining seven meetings, which demonstrated their confidence in the peace process. [18] The historic peace accord was signed on 2 December 1997. Thus, the process of the alienation of the tribals that began in the early seventies gradually seemed to reach the stage of integration some twenty-five years later. However, enduring peace appears to be elusive, and there are rumblings of dissatisfaction over the implementation of the accord.