As the clause-by-clause examination of the implementation process discussed in part four of this paper indicates, some of the structures envisaged have been set up. These structures basically were intended to address the main grievances of the tribal people. One such source of grievance was the settlement of Bengalis on their land, negating the advantages of the CHT being their exclusive habitat. A second set of grievances resulted from the interventions by the central government, which violated the principle of the tribals' special status. Third, there was a sense of underdevelopment; however, this sense did not precipitate a desire to see mega-development projects, because one such project—the Kaptai dam—had caused havoc with tribal settlements and culture. The issues of underdevelopment rested more on matters relating to socioeconomic development, such as education, employment, and so on. In any case, there is concern that expectations in these regards have not been fulfilled. The post-accord grievances relate to the government's failure to make the CHT a completely demilitarized zone, though the government has its own considerations in deciding to maintain army camps in the region. The tribals are also unhappy with the lack of full implementation of resettlement benefits for the returnees. Besides, there is dissatisfaction over the fact that the internally displaced persons have not been fully rehabilitated. Although the Ministry for the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been established, the Advisory Council has yet to meet. The ministry, it is felt, occupies a marginal status within the ministerial set up of the government. In addition, since the accord, non-governmental organizations have had easy access to the region for providing input in regards to the needed rehabilitation, resettlement, and development. The human rights lobby in Bangladesh has articulated instances of violations of human rights, especially abduction and rape.
The implementation status as noted in the earlier section reveals that the structures set up did not perform, or only partially performed, their intended roles or discharged their assigned responsibilities. Therefore, simply having acts framed to set up local bodies guaranteeing tribal representation, or commissions with defined jurisdiction, is not enough. For the success of the accord, the provisions must be made fully operational, so that the tribals do not feel pushed to take up arms again and the government does not require diverting resources to keep peace.
It is important to note that there are other issues that are relevant to the successful implementation of any accord or document of understanding between two parties. Two such issues may be mentioned here. To be effective, any accord must be based on the universal consensus of all the players in the field. Second, the representative and authoritative status of the principal actors must not be denied or challenged.
To take up the first issue, the two major political parties in Bangladesh, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), tend to adopt antagonistic postures with respect to each other, whatever the issue. The successive regimes since the emergence of Bangladesh have involved themselves with peacemaking initiatives, the governments of Ziaur Rahman and that of Khaleda Zia being no exception. This has been discussed in detail in earlier parts of the paper. In fact, the peace initiative of the Awami League government has been built on earlier initiatives. But the BNP, then in opposition, had opposed the accord as being contrary to constitutional principles and regarded it as a "sell out," staging protest demonstrations. Gradually, however, the BNP moved away from its earlier position and only advocated for certain changes in the accord. The Awami League, on the other hand, claimed the peace accord as an exclusive achievement of its party. The achievement was personalized and Sheikh Hasina was projected both in national and international media as the exclusive architect of peace. In order for the peace accord to successfully serve its purpose, all major actors must own it. Now, with the change of government, the fate of the implementation process hangs in the balance, though it is also a fact that even during the Awami League regime, the implementation process was carried out only partially.
As to the issue of the legitimacy of representative roles of the parties to the accord, the Awami League's role in arriving at the accord by a committee headed by the party's chief whip in the Parliament has been open to criticism. The committee signed the accord on behalf of the government of Bangladesh. An all-party committee, including the BNP, would have earned better legitimacy for the accord document. Lack of cooperation between the two parties and the BNP's continued boycott of Parliament made the issue of all-party consensus moot. On the other side, other tribal groups and organizations questioned the authority of PCJSS to assume a representative role for all tribal groups and reach an understanding with the government. The Pahari Gano Parishad (PGP or Hill Peoples Council), Pahari Chatra Parishad (PCP or Hill Students Council), and Hill Women Federation (HWF) have argued that the PCJSS settled for less because of their own internal politics, and failed to achieve full autonomy for the pahari (hills) people. The Hill Women Federation is a politically active and motivated group. Thus, these issues weaken the status of the accord and undermine its implementation process.