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Part Six


Recent Trends: Some Tentative Hypotheses

 

The political scenario changed with the election of October 2001. The BNP, leading a coalition, returned with an overwhelming majority and formed the government. It has been noted in a preceding part of the paper that at the time of the signing of the peace accord, the BNP was in opposition and had been critical of the accord. Except for political agitation, and the election manifesto, there is no explicit indication of what the BNP stand is towards the accord now that it is in power. The BNP was absent from the Parliament when the bills related to the accord were discussed. Therefore no documentary evidence exists about its position on the accord.

The BNP government is not yet two months old and it is not possible to predict future trends and positions at this point in time. However, there are tentative indications that the prime minister considers the affairs of the CHT as sensitive issues. Contrary to the stipulations of the accord, the prime minister kept the portfolio of the CHT Ministry to herself and appointed the only tribal member elected to the Parliament on BNP nomination as the deputy minister. The government has not yet interfered with the five other important ranks that the tribals are entitled to under the accord, i.e. Chairman of the Task force on Refugees, Chairman of CHTDB, and Chairmen of the three Hill District Councils. The Awami League filled in these positions during its term of office with tribals who could be considered Awami League supporters and the new government has not yet made any changes. However, putting the broad national canvas in perspective, it seems likely that the new government would ultimately bring in its own supporters.

The BNP government has suspended distribution of tender on all development projects and food grains in the three Hill Districts (Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari) until further notice. [20] The CHTDB, since 1976, and the Hill District Councils, since 1989, have been in charge of different development activities. This interruption is contrary to the existing provisions under the law.

Politically and historically, the Awami League seems to enjoy greater trust and working relationships with minority groups, whether ethnic or religious. Towards the end of the Awami League regime however, there was a distancing of position and dissatisfaction over the pace of implementation of the accord. The BNP's support among Bengali settlers apparently is quite high. The tribals now are likely to watch the BNP moves more carefully, and the BNP would do well to build a support base among the tribals. It is yet to be seen whether BNP's conservative alliance partner proves to be a liability in this regard. The fact that the prime minister has not yet met Shantu Larma, chairman of the Regional Council and leader of the PCJSS, is indicative of the importance she attaches to the implementation scheme of the accord. [21]

However, the above discussions are tentative in nature. It has been indicated already that two months is a fairly short time to come up with hypotheses or predict trends.

  

[20] See the news item headlined "Tender for all development works and distribution of food grains in the three Hill Districts suspended" (headline translated by the author from the original Bangla, "Tin Parbattya Jelay Shob Unnayanmulok Kajer Tender O Khaddo Shoshsho Bitoron Sthogito"), written by a staff reporter in Prothom Alo, 22 October 2001. Prothom Alo is a Bangla daily newspaper published in Dhaka.

[21] See the news item headlined "The Hills Peace Accord is still neither here nor there" (headline translated by the author from the original Bangla, "Parbattya Shanti Chuktir Obostha Ekhono Na Ghorka Na Ghatka"), written by a staff reporter in Janakantha, 24 November 2001. Janakantha is a Bangla daily newspaper published in Dhaka.

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