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The WTO is currently a 148 member strong
organisation. This number includes 32 Least
Developed Countries (LDCs), six of them are
founding members (Bangladesh being one of
them), 24 more LDCs signed-in or joined later,
and another eleven that are either Observers
or in the accession process. As may be readily
observed, more than a quarter of the WTO
Members and Observers come from the LDC ranks.
In an organisation which is supposed to be
membership driven, where every member
theoretically enjoys veto power in the
decision making process, one would expect that
the interests and concerns of the LDCs would
be acted upon on priority basis, particularly
given their formidable numerical presence.
However, as is said in England, justice is
open to all -- like the Ritz Hotel. One
wonders whether the WTO often behaves like the
Ritz Hotel when it comes to its income-poor
members.
As we mark the first decade of the WTO one may
be also be curious to know what has happened
to the LDCs during this period. The trends
highlighted below, however, cannot be
necessarily attributed to the nature of
functioning of the multilateral trading
system.
Exports and Trade Balance: According to UNCTAD,
in 2004, LDCs share in world trade (export
plus import) stood at 0.68 per cent
(approximately $13 billion), compared to 3.06
per cent in 1954. However, our estimate, based
on WTO data set on 48 LDCs reveals that the
share of the LDCs in global export has
increased marginally from 0.46 per cent to
0.58 per cent between 1995 to 2003 (last year
for which figures are available). The share of
these LDCs in global imports also registered
marginal increase from 0.65 per cent in 1995
to 0.71 per cent in 2003.
In this connection, one needs to be reminded
of the fact that the top 5 LDC exporters in
2003 (Angola, Bangladesh, Yemen, Equatorial
Guinea, and Myanmar) accounted for about 57
per cent of the total exports of the group.
This process of export concentration within
the LDCs is increasing. During 1995-2003, LDCs
as a group continued to experience high
negative trade balance. Indeed, average trade
deficit increased by more than 30 per cent in
the non-oil primary commodity dependent LDCs.
Foreign Direct Investment: Concurrently, the
share of LDCs in global FDI inflows
experienced an upward trend during the period
of 1995-2004, increasing from 0.43 per cent to
1.65 per cent. However, these FDI inflows to
the LDCs were highly concentrated in oil
exporting/producing countries, e.g. top 5 LDCs
(i.e. Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea,
Myanmar, and Chad) accounted for about 61 per
cent of the FDI inflows.
Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance: We do,
however, observe some progress in case of
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flow to
the LDCs, increasing at an average rate of 8.7
per cent per annum between 1995-2003. This
resulted in an increase in the share of LDCs
in total ODA flows to all developing countries
from about 26.3 per cent (1995) to 38.8 per
cent (2003) during the same period. As a
matter of fact, perceptible increase in ODA
flow to LDCs was observed particularly in the
post-2001 period.
Some increase in the inflow was also observed
in case of trade-related technical assistance
and capacity building support, although the
quality of such support still remains suspect.
Economic Growth: The positive changes which we
observe for the LDCs as a group, in terms of
trade and investment performance, coupled with
foreign aid inflow, were paralleled by some
improvement in the real GDP growth rates.
Indeed, the LDCs recorded an average growth
rate of about 5.2 per cent per annum during
2001-2004, against about 4.8 per cent during
1995-2000.
Dynamism and Differentiation
Thus, one cannot deny the fact that we observe
some dynamism in the economies of the LDCs.
There is a positive interpretation of this,
which gives us hope and which the global
community of nations should take into
cognisance. When development-friendly domestic
reforms are pursued and when the global
environment is conducive, LDCs are indeed able
to ensure growth and register progress. LDCs
are not a black hole, as some would like to
project them. What we need is support of the
global institutions such as the WTO to help us
actualise the potentials about which we are
aware, potentials which we are capable of
realising. The indicators of success give us
hope and imbue us with confidence. We want the
developed countries to keep this perspective
in view when we negotiate concessions in the
WTO place our demands at various international
forums.
However, we should also not lose sight of the
broader picture of marginalisation of the LDCs
as a group. The dynamism I have just mentioned
is also characterised by a continuing and
persistent process of severe differentiation
and acute polarisation. The flip-side of these
apparent indicators of progress in the LDCs is
that these marginal advances have been hardly
adequate to precipitate any significant and
tangible improvement in the lives and
livelihood of the overwhelming population in
the LDCs. These average macro-economic
aggregates can at best tinker only at the
margin, and conceal the unabated trends of
deprivation and desperation within and between
countries.
Sustained Poverty, Growing Inequality
A number of examples may be cited to
illustrate the sustained level of poverty in
the LDCs
and the growing inequality, in this group of
countries. The proportion of undernourished
population in the LDCs has remained stagnant
at 38 per cent since the early 1970s.
According to IFPRI, the food security index of
the LDCs is much worse than it was before --
their per capita food consumption index has
declined by 6 per cent over the last 20 years.
Today, nearly 650 million poor and hungry
people live in the LDCs -- a number which has
hardly changed during the last decade. This
process was largely underwritten by a steady
deterioration of income distribution in the
LDCs.
More than half of the LDC population continue
to live on less than $1 a day, while about 81
per cent live on less than $2 a day. The
number of people living in extreme poverty in
LDCs is likely to increase from 334 million in
2000 to 471 million in 2015.
There goes your Millennium Development Goals!
Indeed, the aggravation of in-country income
inequality was paralleled by a growing income
gap between the richest and the poorest
countries in the world. Between 1960-1962 and
2000-2002, the gap of per capita GDP between
the 20 richest and 20 poorest countries
increased by three times. In the same vein,
the share of the richest ten per cent of the
world's population has increased from 51.6 per
cent to 53.4 per cent of total world income.
Reviewing the progress indicators of the LDCs,
the optimists proclaim that we live in the
best of all worlds, and the pessimists fear
that this might very well be true.
The author is Executive Director, Centre for
Policy Dialogue (CPD). The article draws on a
section of his Introductory Statement
delivered at the Inaugural Session of the
recently concluded International Civil Society
Forum 2005: For Advancing LDC Interests in the
Sixth WTO Ministerial, Dhaka, October 3-5.
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